Civil Society in the Arab Spring: Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya by Meltz, Danielle
University of Colorado, Boulder
CU Scholar
Undergraduate Honors Theses Honors Program
Spring 2016
Civil Society in the Arab Spring: Tunisia, Egypt,
and Libya
Danielle Meltz
University of Colorado, Boulder, dame5869@colorado.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholar.colorado.edu/honr_theses
Part of the International and Area Studies Commons, and the International Relations Commons
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by Honors Program at CU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Undergraduate Honors
Theses by an authorized administrator of CU Scholar. For more information, please contact cuscholaradmin@colorado.edu.
Recommended Citation
Meltz, Danielle, "Civil Society in the Arab Spring: Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya" (2016). Undergraduate Honors Theses. Paper 1228.
1 
 
 
 
CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE ARAB SPRING: TUNISIA, EGYPT AND LIBYA 
By 
Danielle Meltz 
Dept. of Political Science, University of Colorado, Boulder 
 
 
Defended March 29, 2016 
 
Thesis Advisor:  
Dr. Michael Kanner, Dept. of Political Science  
 
Defense Committee: 
Dr. Michael Kanner, Dept. of Political Science  
Dr. Janet Donavan, Dept. of Political Science  
Daniel Dubois, Dept. of History 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
Abstract  
The emphasis of civil society during a revolution could not have been made clearer when 
Tunisia’s National Dialogue Quartet, a coalition of NGOs, won the 2015 Nobel Peace Prize for 
the coordination of civil society organizations leading to a peaceful revolution. This research 
aims to understand the connection between higher levels of civil society, and lower levels of 
revolutionary violence during a revolution, specifically in the Arab Spring countries of; Tunisia, 
Egypt and Libya. Moreover, it looks at how the strength of a civil society is limited by the 
institutions within a state.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 Prior to 2011, the Arab World had been viewed as a region with strict and unchanging 
governments. When a Tunisian fruit vendor in December of 2010 set himself of fire in protest 
against his government, the spread of uprisings and protests in the region was unprecedented. 
The years that followed witnessed an extreme level of protests and citizen demands, unlike 
anything the Arab world had previously witnessed. With similar time period, culture, 
geographical region, countries that went through the Arab Spring ended up on four different 
trajectories.  
1) Countries in which large-scale peaceful protests lead to major, if not permanent, regime 
transformation. 
2) Some countries experienced more limited peaceful contestation which led the leaders to 
make equally limited political adjustments.  
3) While others had peaceful protests that were met by violent repression, which led to 
prolonged fighting between the incumbents of their challengers or foreign intervention. 
4) Lastly, countries that experienced virtually no contestation and as such practically no 
regime changes were made.  
The theme of this paper is understand why it is some countries experience a more successful 
revolution than others. Revolutionary violence here is used as a measurement of the 
successfulness of the revolution. In this case, the dependent variable (revolutionary violence) 
will be measured against a varying independent variable (civil society). The paper will also look 
at how the growth of civil society is itself limited by its own state and institutions, such as the 
laws and military of a state. Earlier this year, Tunisia’s National Dialogue Quartet won the Nobel 
Peace Prize for the coordination of civil society organizations leading to a peaceful transition. 
This thesis researches the relationship between a strong civil society and less revolutionary 
violence. The lower levels of conflict in Tunisia, were also met with higher levels of 
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coordination, and a quicker and more effective transition into a democracy. Therefore, it can 
inferred that the level of civil society correlates to the levels of revolutionary violence a country 
experiences, which is a determining factor in the successfulness of a revolution. The Arab Spring 
is a highly researched time period, and this paper attempts to contribute to that research by 
analyzing the importance of civil society. Three in depth case studies will help provide insight to 
the inverse relationship between civil society and revolutionary violence looking at Tunisia, 
Egypt, and Libya.  
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Revolutions and Democratization  
Revolutions are a collective action in which the citizens of a particular country 
effectively mobilize outside of political institutions to make a fundamental change in political 
power. They are used as a method of overthrowing a particular government, or fighting for social 
change, and act differently depending on the country, the time period, the number of people 
involved, and several other factors (O’Kane, 2013). As Burton argues, revolutions are less likely 
to result in political change, and more likely to result in widespread violence (Burton, 1978.) In 
the process of citizens conflicting viewpoints, violence during protests amongst citizens or 
between citizens and authorities been one of the results.   
Various levels of violence can take place during a revolution, and this paper focuses in on 
the conflict, or lack thereof, experienced by countries that were part of the Arab Spring. It seeks 
to research why Tunisia was named the Jasmine Revolution, while Libya ended in a near civil 
war. The Arab Spring has been categorized as a new wave of democracy, with countries 
attempting to overthrow their authoritarian regimes. In the most basic sense, a democracy is a 
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form of government in which citizens have the right to free and fair elections, and they have 
basic human rights. This can expand on to include a variety of political, social and economic 
rights, and society’s ability to participate in civil society and social movements (Moghadam, 
2013). 
The response of revolutionary violence to counter-revolutionary violence from the 
government is one of the main sources of conflict. In countries with a stable authoritarian 
regime, counter-revolutionary violence has led to revolutionary violence, as in the case of Latin 
America (Mayer, 2000). This relationship between revolutions and violence expands beyond the 
Arab Spring, and can be seen globally. Looking at a history of revolutions, an example of a 
violent revolution is the French Revolution between 1793-1794, when between 16,000 to 40,000 
people were killed. In contrast, nonviolent revolutions such as East Germany in 1989 were 
named the Peaceful Revolution (Nepstad, 2011). This paper seeks to explore whether civil 
society is the main factor that dictates whether or not a revolution will be violent. 
 
CIVIL SOCIETY 
 The term civil society has varied across time and regions, therefore before discussing it in 
the research, an exploration of the term is essential. Civil society has been known to mean a 
growth of the middle class, to the middle ground of communication between people and the 
state. Habermas discussed the idea that civil society allows individuals the opportunity to 
participate in public affairs while identifying with the common good (Weber, 2013, 513). 
Civil society as we know it today developed in the late 18th century by a number of political 
theorists – civil society became known as a domain in society that in separate but equal to the 
government. A space for citizens to discuss and coordinate their shared interests (Carothers and 
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Barndt, 18, 1999). In the 1990’s, the idea of civil society gained popularity as democracy became 
more common, and civil society had the space to step in and take action while governments 
became less restrictive. (Carothers and Barndt, 1999, pg. 18) Civil society encompasses 
everything beyond the scope of the government, this includes but is not limited to NGOs, labor 
unions, professional associations, religious association’s sports clubs, and social or political 
organizations. Robert Putnam argued the importance of civil society in his book, Bowling Alone: 
America’s Declining Social Capital,” when he stated that a weak civil society results in a weak 
civic engagement (Putnam, 1995). 
Weber states that civil society rejects ideologies and traditions, allowing individuals to be 
free of ascribed identities; to which I disagree. In countries that experienced the Arab Spring, 
often time civil society organizations such as NGO’s were forbidden, whereas organizations 
based on religious values were permitted. In instances such as these where religious 
organizations are a large part of a country’s civil society, their presence cannot be ignored. 
Putnam argues that even in the U.S. religious communities provide society with support, and 
contribute to the civil society (Putnam, 2000, 79). 
Civil society is a space where individuals can communicate and collaborate. According to 
Weber, civil society implies and requires a certain attitude to conflict, 
“I define civil society as an open public sphere where individuals can institutionalize and 
thus mediate between different conflicting interests (in particular by making use of voluntary 
associations)” (Weber, 511, 2013). 
The ability of a society to organize aids in building a good and functioning society. 
Within a society, there are conflicting interests. Social conflict theory, a Marxist-based social 
theory, argues that individuals in a society have different levels of material and non-material 
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resources which result in varying degrees of power and exploitation. The stress created between 
these varying groups in society results in conflict, which in many respects can be mediated 
through civil society (Weber, 2013, 513). This is where the aspect of the organizations being 
voluntary is essential, if organizations are forced upon a society and are government controlled, 
they do not have the same mediating power as those creating from a society organically. Civil 
society often emerges as a space where individuals can be free to express their interests and 
mediate conflicts. 
While civil society has general similarities globally, the composition of organizations and 
their capabilities vary by region. Civil society in the Arab World uniquely includes religious 
organizations, and is limited by institutions of the state such as the laws and military. Various 
countries in the Arab world, and every country being discussed in this paper, had some type of 
restrictions on the formation of NGO’s or free association. In Tunisia, free association was 
granted by the constitution, but was restricted for certain types of religious groups. Contrarily, in 
Libya, every NGO had to be connected in some way to the government. These types of 
institutional restrictions dictate the growth of civil society, and therefore dictate its effectiveness. 
Furthermore, during the revolution the military and security forces of a state were strong 
contributing factors to how a civil society could act.  
Even though the Arab Spring has proven to be unsuccessful, the Middle East did gain a 
new sense of political understanding. The millennials of the Arab world gathered strength and 
aligned themselves with modern political ideals. The political language of the Arab world has 
evolved to make democracy, human rights, and civil society in Arabic terms (dimukratiya, huquq 
al-insan and mujtama madani respectively) all part of common rhetoric, even for the Islamist 
parties. Middle Eastern governments have often used the power of the government to stay in 
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power, and have stayed away from democratization or free elections. In a region which has often 
felt constrained in terms of freedom of association, the Arab Spring is a look at how varying 
levels of civil society have an effect on the revolutionary process.  
 
REVOLUTIONARY VIOLENCE: A MEASUREMENT OF A REVOLUTION’S SUCCESS 
 Violence has been a factor of revolutions throughout different time periods and regions, 
making it an interesting dependent variable to measure when looking at the successfulness of a 
revolution. The term revolutionary violence in particular is being used because it acknowledges 
the relationship between civil society and the violence created only as a product of the 
revolution, and not other outside factors. There were a variety of outcomes for countries that 
went through the Arab Spring. The three countries being analyzed all reached democratic 
presidential elections, however did so with varying degrees of successfulness and sustainability. 
One factor of measuring the successfulness of these countries revolutions, is through the amount 
of internal conflict they experienced from 2011 to 2015. Countries that struggled to reach a 
democracy, also experienced higher levels of violence during that time period, making the level 
of internal conflict will be measured as a way to assess the level of difficulty a country had 
during the Arab Spring, and their success. Internal conflict will be measured through two 
different quantitative data sets, as well as a qualitative understanding of the conflicts themselves. 
The first one is an assessment of the number of internal conflicts fought and for what duration, 
and the second one is an assessment of the intensity of internal conflict. 
Internal conflict fought represents the number and duration of conflicts fought within a 
country, this includes civil, interstate, one-sided and non-state conflicts. The data was conducted 
by Vision of Humanity, and the internal conflict is scored on a scale from 1 to 5, with 1 being the 
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least and 5 being the most. In countries which scored with a scale of 1 there was no internal 
conflict, and on a scale of 5 was very high levels of internal conflict. The sources used to gather 
this data include UCDP Battle Related Deaths Dataset, Non-State Conflict Dataset, and the One-
Sided Violence Dataset. This indicator is calculated over a five year period, and is two years 
lagging. 
These data sets from Vision of Humanity are an informative way of understanding 
conflict. It measures the number and duration of conflicts that occur within a country’s legal 
borders (Vision of Humanity). The degree of internal conflicts fought include a variety of 
different factors including the conflicts fought amongst citizens and between citizens and 
security forces. This gives a holistic understanding of the conflict starting from the year before 
the Arab Spring to the most recent data. Furthermore, this information has been used in 
comparison to other data sets such as Polity IV, due to their incompleteness of information 
during the Arab Spring.  
 
Internal conflicts fought1 
Country 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Tunisia 2 2 3 3 3 3 
Egypt 2 4 4 4 4 4 
Libya 2 3 4 4 4 4 
  
This data set shows how in 2010 prior to the Arab Spring, all three countries faced the 
same levels of internal conflict. In 2011, the first year of the Arab Spring Tunisia saw no 
                                               
1 Vision of Humanity, Internal Conflicts Fought data  
10 
 
increase in conflict, while Egypt and Libya did. All countries between 2010 and 2015 saw an 
increase in internal conflict, and Egypt and Libya witnessed the largest increases.  
The Intensity of Internal Conflicts adds to our understanding of the conflict as it uses a 
quantitative assessment and turns it into a quantitative assessment of the intensity of conflicts 
within a country. The data operates on a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 meaning that there was no 
organized conflict within the country, and 5 meaning that there was severe internal crisis, civil 
war, violent force used within a certain continuity in an organized and systematic way 
throughout the country. 
 
Intensity of Internal Conflicts2 
Country 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Tunisia 2 3 3 4 4 3 
Egypt 2 3 3 4 4 2 
Libya 2 5 5 3 4 5 
  
             This data set again begins in 2010 with each country at the same levels of 
intensity of internal conflicts. Libya is the not only the one country that reaches the most intense 
level of conflict, but does so for 3 of out of the 6 years of the Arab Spring. A qualitative 
explanation of these conflicts will be discussed in the case studies of this paper.  
From the data, it can be seen that Libya suffered the most number of internal conflicts, with the 
highest intensity from the time periods of 2011-2015. The year 2010, which was before any of 
the uprisings took place, is used as a reference point. All three of the countries in both sets of 
data had the same amount of internal conflict before the Arab Spring. In this respect, one can 
                                               
2 Vision of Humanity, Intensity of Internal Conflicts data 
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analyze the revolutionary violence assuming all other forms of conflict remained constant. This 
brings us to the discussion of what effect civil society has on a country’s ability to perform a 
successful revolution. 
In order to better compare the different levels of civil society to the levels of internal conflict, the 
following table has been created to represent where each country falls on a civil society scale.  
1- No form of organizations or free association   
2- Organizations as an extension of the government  
3- Free association separate from the government but limited in capacity and size (such as 
restricting religious organizations, being monitored by the government, and seemingly 
arbitrary organization restrictions) 
4- A developed civil society met with restraints (such as restricting religious organizations)  
5- Vibrant and active civil society amongst different ages and sectors of society 
The following table categories the three case studies civil societies prior to the Arab Spring.  
 
 
 
 
 
 This data set shows how Tunisia had the most developed civil society of the three 
countries as it was granted freedom of association in the Constitution and was a vibrant part of 
society of different sectors and age groups; however, religious organizations faced restrictions. 
Anyone or any organization that was part of the Islamist party, Ennahda, was banned by the 
former president Zine El Abidine Ben Ali. Egypt was also granted freedom of association, 
however in order to form an organization citizens had many more obstacles and restrictions to 
follow. Egypt’s law of 84/2002 required all NGO’s to obtain permission from the Ministry of 
Social Solidarity before registration, which was inconsistent with their international obligation to 
Country Civil Society 
ranking 
Tunisia 4 
Egypt 3 
Libya 2 
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respect the right to freedom of association. And Libya had the lowest level of civil society, while 
organizations existed they were all an extension of the government, which by the definition 
reached earlier does not constitute as a civil society.  
 
METHODOLOGY 
In order to research the relationship between civil society and revolutionary violence, a 
selection of case studies was used. There is an increasing recognition to the value of qualitative 
research, particularly in the form of case studies (Houghton, Casey, Shaw, Murphy, 2012). 
Multiple case studies allow for comparisons which can be particularly useful in the absence of 
quantitative data. Lincoln and Guba argued that qualitative research has is benefits but it must be 
conducted with rigor and be; credible, dependable, confirmable, and transferable (Houghton, 
Casey, Shaw, Murphy, 2012). These criteria are met through the use of multiple sources of data, 
and a broader more global explanation of the findings. Robert Yin advocates for case studies in 
times where a researcher is attempting to explore and explain events, such as the impact of civil 
society (Johnson, Joslyn, Reynolds, 2001) The use of multiple case studies are also more likely 
to have explanatory power than a single case study, as it allows the researcher to test a theory 
multiple times. Furthermore, the lack of quantitative data on civil society gives reason to the use 
of qualitative research. It is for these reasons that in order to uncover the relationship between 
civil society and revolutionary violence, I chose a selection of case studies.  
A measurement of civil society is particularly difficult in the Middle East, where certain 
aspects of civil society have been banned in a multitude of countries, as discussed in the previous 
literature review. In this case, the case studies provide the advantage of an analysis involving 
qualitative variables, as well as historical and social context. The revolutionary violence of each 
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country has been analyzed through quantitative data involving the number of conflicts, their 
duration, and how intense they were. In the absence of quantitative data for both variables, a case 
study analysis will help provide insight to the inverse relationship between civil society and 
revolutionary violence. 
The countries chosen for case studies all experienced a revolution during the Arab Spring 
to account for a similar time period, culture, geographical region, and historical context, while 
allowing for a variance of the independent variable. By controlling for political instability, 
resistance, as discussed below, the three countries which start the Arab Spring off in a similar 
place are; Tunisia, Egypt and Libya.  
 
CASE STUDY SELECTION:  
CONTROLLING FOR POLITICAL INSTABILITY AND MEDIA 
Political instability and social media are the two control variables in this case study 
research. In order to choose a selection of case studies that would aid in explaining the 
connection between civil society and revolutionary violence experienced during a revolution the 
article, The Arab Spring: A Quantitative Analysis, by Andrey V. Korotayev, Leonid M. Issaev, 
Sergey Yu. Malkov and Alisa R. Shishkina, was useful in choosing countries that experienced 
the same level of political instability. This is an important factor when researching civil society’s 
impact on revolutionary violence; if the cases being researched had varying levels of political 
instability (one was much more instable and easier to overthrow) than the others, then there 
would be a clear determining variable related to the levels of revolutionary violence.  
The data being used analyzes the political instability of countries in the Arab Spring 
through the use of multiple indicators such as; conflict potential index, social instability, the 
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ability of the government to reduce social tension, as well as the country’s immunity to 
revolutionary violence. The authors of this article used nonlinear regression method to measure 
the level of political instability (IUNST) and the resistance index of the country (Korotayev, 
Issaey, Malkov, Sergey, Shishkina, 2014, 158). 
Country IUNST Resistance Index 
  
Tunisia 37.61 1 
Egypt 50.43 1 
Libya 54.72 1 
Yemen 15.2 2 
Syria 29.05 2 
Bahrain 17.8 2 
Morocco 11.88 3 
Jordan 15.06 3 
Algeria 6.55 4 
Lebanon 3.66 4 
Kuwait 7.07 4 
Oman 4.58 5 
Saudi Arabia 5.62 6 
Qatar 2.2 7 
UAE 2.62 7 
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  This data shows the varying degrees of political instability in the Arab world. The three 
countries with a political instability of 1, represent the most politically instable countries. 
Whereas on the opposite end of the spectrum, there were hardly any protests in Qatar or the 
UAE. Similarly, there were a few protests in Saudi Arabia, after which the government illegally 
doled out $130 billion in financial benefits, and reminded Saudis that demonstrations are not 
only illegal but also un-Islamic (The National, 2011).  
 From this data, the three countries with a resistance index of 1 were chosen as case 
studies. A resistance index of 1 is defined by the study as ‘extremely low resistance: a successful 
revolution,’ however it is important to acknowledge that this index is used in comparison with 
other Arab spring countries. Within Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, successfulness of transition was 
met with varying degrees of violence throughout a variety of time periods, which leads to the 
question of what other factors were involved. Furthermore, due to their geographical, economic, 
and cultural similarities, Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, are the three countries often used in research 
regarding the Arab Spring. 
 
MEDIA  
 One of the attributes towards Tunisia’s success in the Arab Spring has been its media 
usage, particularly in the beginning of the uprisings. A brief look at the media usage of Tunisia, 
Egypt, and Libya will show that this is in fact not the case. The Arab Spring began when a fruit 
vendor in Sidi Bousaid set himself on fire in the form of a protest against the government. This 
action was filmed by one of his family members, and the video went viral. While media played a 
large role kick-starting the Arab Spring, it did not play as large of a role in the years to follow. 
Especially when looking at a comparison between the three countries. Tunisia had one of the 
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most developed internet systems of the country’s going through the Arab spring. However, the 
Tunisian government has large amounts of control and censorship over web content, and was 
filtering through what people were posting onto social media and deleting certain posts. The 
government imprisoned bloggers for writing about what was happening during the uprisings.  
 In Egypt, the government’s response to the initial uprisings was to control 
communication flow through the internet. On 25 January 2011, the State Security Investigations 
Service ordered Twitter to be blocked. The following day twitter was shut down, and on the 
night following, the government shut down the internet and text messaging. The government 
tried to control all information that traveled across the country through the internet (BBC, 2011). 
Many Egyptians who were then disconnected from the internet took to the streets to find out 
what was happening; it is argued that the internet shut down could have been counter intuitive as 
this was the process through which many citizens joined the protest. On 2 February 2011 the 
internet was turned back on. If media was the main attributer to Tunisia successfully going 
through the Arab Spring, one would expect higher levels of media usage in Tunisia when 
compared with Egypt. However, the following two data sets from the researchers Lotan, Graeff, 
Ananny, Gaffney, Pearce and Boyd, depict almost identical numbers in terms of the number of 
tweets posted and the number of actors involved.  
 
Figure. Chart of Flow Dynamics by Single Actor Types, Tunisia Dataset  
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Figure. Chart of Flow Dynamics by Single Actor Types, Egypt Dataset  
 
 Libya also faced an internet shut down, it was turned on and off for a few days after the 
initial protests in an effort to prevent the violent protests from spreading (Howard, Agarwal and 
Hussain, 2011). It has been argued that the impact of the internet shutdown was less severe than 
in Egypt, primarily because fewer Libyans had prior internet access. However, those who did 
have access were the elite, and who could have had potentially more influence in the revolution 
(Wollman, 2011). 
 Looking at the media usage in all three countries, it is clear that while media acts as a 
form of communication, because the media usage did not differ heavily amongst the three 
countries it was not the main factor behind Tunisia’s successful revolution. Media can act as a 
catalyst for action, but only if that momentum exists already. There must already be an incentive 
to perform political action, and the means to access media for media to play any role at all.  
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THEORY 
FUNCTIONS OF CIVIL SOCIETY 
 The two main factors of civil society that will be analyzed when looking at the three case 
studies are;  
1) Ability to join an organization 
2) Collaboration between organizations.  
The choice of these two factors draws on other researcher’s models for analyzing a civil society, 
such as Merkel and Lauth’s function model, as well as Edward’s roles model. Both models have 
more functions of civil society listed which are beneficial when looking at it from a global 
perspective; however from the Middle Eastern perspective of civil society not all of them apply. 
For example, the first essential function of civil society in Merkel and Lauth’s model is 
protection.  
“Civil society is the social sphere beyond the state in which citizens, endowed with 
rights, are free to organize their lives without state interference. The state has to ensure 
protection of the private sphere. The task of civil society is to remind the state of this 
warrant and, if needed, compel the state to honor it” (Paffenholz, 21, 2010). 
In two of the case study countries, Egypt and Libya, organizations had to give the 
government advanced notice of their meetings, government officials were allowed to sit in on 
them, and organizations were sometimes requested to send meeting minutes to the government. 
It is functions such as this one that do not fit in with the definition of a Middle Eastern civil 
society, and it is for this reason that a broader two-function approach has been chosen.  
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 The ability to join an organization is the first step to participating and impacting the 
surrounding society. This action of participating as an active member of society feeds into the 
concept of one of the most basic functions of a democracy: that the power is left upon the people 
who rule their elected representatives through free elections. Engaging in the society around you 
extends the participatory need past the action of voting. Participatory action in order to create 
change is a function of being a part of an organization and a democracy (Merkel and Lauth, 
1998). Moreover, a core function of democracy beyond citizen participation is decision-making 
ability. When people choose to participate in civil society they are acting as citizens capable of 
influencing their society. They begin to practice developing the community around them. This 
expansion of civic participation, practice with decision-making, and holding people and 
organizations accountable, are all attributing factors to a well-functioning democracy 
(Paffenholz, 2010). Ability to joining an organization provides access to practicing these skills, 
making citizens more equip to live in a democracy. In this way, ability to joining an organization 
is the first function of civil society that will be analyzed throughout the case studies.  
 Secondly, after an individual has ability to join an organization, a strong civil society is 
built through effective communication amongst organizations. This function of effective 
communication is invaluable to the theory of lessening conflict during a revolution, as Linz and 
Stepan (1998) argued, an active civil society is invaluable the democratization process. As Nos 
and Pinazo (2013, 344) argued that a strong civil society is necessary for a peaceful political 
transition. Communication amongst organizations prioritizes a free public sphere where citizens 
can participate. This can happen in person, as in protests that have taken place, or through the 
internet through forms such as social media. It provides individuals the space to communicate 
their concerns and thoughts, and allow them to transition those into action (Merkel and Lauth, 
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1998). This creation of the public sphere is essential in building trust and the practice of 
decision-making, which are essential functions not only to a democracy, but also of the transition 
to a democracy (Edwards, 2004). The better the communication amongst organizations across a 
state, the more organized it is as it tries to overturn one of the most powerful forces in a state, its 
government.   
 
CIVIL SOCIETY’S RELATION TO REVOLUTIONARY VIOLENCE   
 As discussed in the previous section, Nos and Pinazo argued that a strong civil society is 
necessary for a peaceful transition. They argued that the communicative role of civil society’s 
participation is important in the transformative political peaceful actions. Revolutionary violence 
in a country greatly impacts a society’s ability to function, collaborate, and operate in solidarity. 
This creates a spiral effect which happens between conflict and civil society; conflict has a 
detrimental impact on civil society, which in turn creates more conflict. The three main way this 
happens is through a disruption of communication, changes in state security, and a loss of trust.   
 One of the pillars of a strong civil society is its ability to communicate, which currently 
often happens through the internet. At the start of the Arab Spring when protests were starting, 
governments would block the internet in an attempt to control the demonstrations. Media played 
such a strong role in the Arab Spring because of how it allowed individuals and organizations 
access to other civil society groups (Paffenholz, 2010, 18). Technology has had dramatic 
implications on a society’s ability to communicate within itself, and taking that away from a 
society prevents it from being able to coordinate and collaborate (Weidmann, 2015, 263). 
Considering that a strong civil society leads to less violence, a weakening of a country’s civil 
society by the state makes violence more likely. As Nos and Pinazo (2013, 344) argued, a strong 
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civil society facilitates peaceful political transitions due to its ability to keep a society engaged 
and aware of unjust effects. Previously in this paper, it was discussed how important a society’s 
ability to collaborate is in order to form a civil society. If a society cannot communicate, it is 
limited in its ability to collaborate, which leads to higher levels of conflict.  
 An increase in security forces acts as an outside factor that also impacts the connection 
between civil society and levels of conflict is the use of security forces. During a revolution the 
increase of civic participation such as protests tends to shift the levels of security to either be 
higher or lower. In this case, the dependent variable (revolutionary violence) has an impact on 
the independent variable (civil society) with the addition of an outside factor (the military). In 
some cases, such as the situations in Egypt and Libya, the eruption of protests lead to an increase 
in military force leading to an increase in conflict. The discussion of Egypt’s and Libya’s 
increase of military power and the implications of it will be discussed in their case studies, 
however it is necessary to acknowledge the connection between the shift in security forces which 
leads to the increase in violence. The theory of this paper, is that if a country’s civil society was 
strong enough to coordinate large and civil protests, that the use of excessive military violence 
would have been unnecessary. However, future research might aid in understanding the 
military’s influence over civil society.  
 Civil society plays an important role in mediating violence during revolutions, due to the 
higher levels of communication and trust associated with it. Trust in this sense refers to political 
trust, a trust in the citizens around you as well as your government. Trust develops in cases of 
strong civil society’s, which fosters enhanced communication, and further collaboration in times 
of conflict. However, in cases where the trust amongst a society is already weak and conflict 
takes place, trust within a society begins to erode (Paffenholz, 2010, 18). This effect can lead 
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people to separate themselves from other forms of interaction, which limits one of the main 
functions of civil society - ability to collaborate between organizations (Paffenholz, 2010, 19). 
Moving forward in the analysis the relationship between civil society and revolutionary violence 
of Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, will be analyzed with the two functions of civil society: ability to 
join an organization and collaboration amongst organizations.  
 
CASE STUDIES 
             The uprisings that spread through the Arab World carried with it the drive for 
citizens to change their way of life, and their government. Citizens demanded a variety of 
changes, including more freedom and democracy. However, the opportunity for someone new to 
be in power resulted in a clash of interests. Different visions were being developed of what the 
new government should look like. In cases where countries had a strong civil society, such as 
Tunisia, mass groups of protestors were able to coordinate and come up with specific goals for 
their government. In Egypt, its organizations were split up by their differences, making it harder 
to achieve a specific set of goals. In other cases, such as Libya, the disjointedness of the public’s 
needs has resulted in higher levels of conflict and a longer period of a scramble towards 
democracy.  From here, the research will be a qualitative assessment of the civil society’s ability 
to mediate conflict and aid in a country’s revolutionary process.  
 
TUNISIA  
 No one could have guessed that the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi, a fruit vendor 
in Sidi Bouzid, would have been the beginning of a slew of uprisings and revolutions across the 
Arab World. On 17 December 2010, Mohamed, a fruit vendor in his hometown had his products 
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confiscated and faced harassment by a municipal official. Mohamed’s cousin filmed what 
happened next, and the video went viral – the catalyst to the Arab Spring (El-Khawas, 2012, 9). 
A few days later on 22 December 2010, another man in the same town killed himself during a 
demonstration, which sparked other violent acts in neighboring towns as protestors tried to set 
police cars on fire, and police fired on protestors in response (El-Khawas, 2012, 10). Conflict 
between police and protestors continued, as police used force to disperse rallies, and security 
forces prevented labor unions from holding a rally. When protestors gathered in front of the 
Ministry of the Interior, they were split up by tear gas. This caused the Democratic Progressive 
Party (PDP) to call on the government, and ask them to focus on communication instead of 
violence (El-Khawas, 2012, 10). 
 Trade unions held a huge rally demanding that Ben Ali step down, and protests continued 
across the country. A couple weeks after the first protest on 14 January 2011, President Zine El 
Abidine Ben Ali stepped down and fled to Saudi Arabia, after 23 years in power. Police 
disappeared from the streets after Ben Ali stepped down, which lead to gangs that set buildings 
on fire and mugged people. In response, neighborhoods formed groups to patrol the streets and 
keep their houses and neighbors safe. Prime Minister Mohamed Ghannouchi began to replace all 
of the Constitutional Democratic Rally members of the government, and after further protests he 
too resigned. On the 27th of February, Beji Caid Essebsi became Prime Minister, and on 3 March 
2011 the Islamist Ennahda party won the majority of seats in the elections for the Constituent 
Assembly.  
For most countries which went through the Arab Spring, their results were disappointing, 
either resulting in no transition at all or long periods of violence. The transition to democracy in 
Tunisia experienced the least amount of violence as compared to the other two case studies, and 
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was called the ‘Jasmine Revolution’ because of it. Tunisia experienced a low level of 
revolutionary violence throughout its revolution. It was the only country that did not see an 
increase in deaths, but it did experience an increase of conflict between the time period between 
2010 and 2015. Violence in Tunisia came in the form of more self-immolations, assassinations, 
and clashes between protests and the police (Saidani and Judy, 2012). Anti-government protests 
took place across the country in 2013, and when the Prime Minister, Ali Larayedh, announced a 
general election, they turned into violent protests over a week. The UGTT stepped in to mediate 
the situation and held crisis talks overnight before it issued a statement calling for the complete 
dissolution of the government (Africa Research Bulletin, 2013). 
 In 2015, Tunisia’s National Dialogue Quartet won the Nobel Peace Prize for its help in the 
peaceful transition to democracy through the Jasmine Revolution. The Tunisian National 
Dialogue Quarter is a coalition of civil society groups that came together in the summer of 2013, 
when Tunisia, the leader of the Arab Spring was faced between a future of either further violence 
or a democracy. The quartet designed a plan to move Tunisia away from the path of violence 
other countries were on, and was compromised of four organizations from Tunisia’s civil 
society: The Tunisian General Labor Union, The Tunisian Confederation of Industry, Trade and 
Handicrafts, The Tunisian Human Rights League, and The Tunisian Order of Lawyers. The 
Quartet was successful in calling for negotiations between political parties currently in power 
and the opposition. This organization of civil societies clearly represents the impact civil society 
can have in aiding successful revolutions, as well as mediating interests and preventing 
revolutionary violence. In order to fully comprehend the full power of civil society in Tunisia, 
there needs to be a closer look at the time period of when the revolution started, and when the 
quartets plan was implemented.  
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 The primary characteristic of a strong civil society is the freedom and ability to join an 
organization. The enforcement of these laws created an environment in which certain groups 
such as student groups, workers, journalists, and other associations were repressed (Global 
Trends in NGO Law). The biggest barrier to entry for an organization during the Ben Ali regime 
was its religious affiliation because Islamist organizations were not allowed to exist. The ability 
to join an organization is only as beneficial as the freedom allowed once the organization has 
been created. With regards to Tunisia’s specific NGO Laws, its Constitution provided freedom to 
association and assembly and dictates that these rights will only be confined in order to protect 
the rights of others or to respect public order. Tunisia’s Law on Associations (under law 154 of 
1959 as amended) allowed two or more persons to found an association and carry out procedures 
on a permanent basis, as long as that they were not a business and did not run a profit. That being 
said, this only pertains to certain types of organizations such as sports, women’s, scientific, 
cultural, etc. Democracy and human rights organizations were not allowed and had often been 
denied registration. When all the documents have been filed, the Ministry has to provide a 
receipt, and there is no length of time dictated for this process. NGO’s in Tunisia have reported 
that the government would routinely withhold requests. The Law on Associations permitted the 
Minister of the Interior to disapprove of an application if its goals might lead to disruption of 
public order. Since many of the laws are vague, the Ministry held a lot of power in terms of 
denying organizations the ability to register. Tunisia’s NGOs also experienced excessive 
government supervision of NGO operations such as home and office-break ins, monitoring 
emails, tapping phone lines, being denied the ability to hold meetings (The International Center 
for Not-for-Profit Law). The Secular civil society in Tunisia contained processes that resembled 
democratic behaviors. Tunisian organizations were allowed to freely run for organization 
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elections, unlike Egypt where the government was allowed to remove candidates running for 
elected positions. They also had freedom in event plan which aids in sustainability (Martin, 
2015). 
 While Tunisia faced certain restrictions in people’s ability to join and create 
organizations, it has experienced a strong history of coordination among organizations. One 
organization in particular that helped bring together Tunisia’s civil society was the General 
Union of Tunisian Workers (UGTT). Beginning in 2007, issue-based demonstrations were 
organized by labor movements (Kudlenko, 2015, 172). The UGTT was also responsible for the 
trade union strikes in Gafsa in 2008 and in Sfax in 2010, which were a collaboration of people 
from different sectors of society (Deane, 2013, 13). The organization has had a long history of 
challenging the government, and consequently being repressed by it. With around 520,000 
members, the UGTT is Tunisia’s largest civil society organization, and has always connected 
social needs with political demands by acting outside of the political system. During the early 
period of the uprisings in 2010, UGTT decided to stay out of the conflict and act as a mediator 
between the state and the protests, however it quickly changed its strategy and worker unions 
around the country began supporting the movement. Similarly, the Bar Association is an 
organization that has played a role in Tunisia’s revolution since the beginning, and in 2011 called 
upon its members to stage national protests. Unions are a strong part of Tunisia’s civil society, 
with organizations such as the Secondary School Teachers’ Union (Syndicat National des 
Enseignements SNES), the Primary School Teacher’s Union, the Health Workers Union, and the 
Postal Workers Union. The UGTT lead the largest demonstration on January 14th 2011, when 
hundreds of thousands of citizens partook in a national protest, and marched towards the 
president from all regions of the country. The diversity in protestors made the momentum 
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difficult to control, with people ranging from high school to elders, lawyers, women, 
businessmen, and members of Tunisia’s labor federation (Angrist, 2013). These demonstrations 
and actions involving Tunisian’s from multiple sectors of society emphasize the ability of 
Tunisia’s civil society to coordinate.   
 Conflict in Tunisia role an incremental amount during the course of the Arab Spring, 
however it did not lead to an increase in death or other forms of crime such as looting. One 
aspect to take into consideration is the role the military played throughout this process. The 
Tunisian military has always been separate from the government. It is a small military in 
comparison to the rest of the militaries in the Arab world, and has never posed a major threat to 
the regime. Tunisia’s first leader, Habib Bourguiba, ensured that the military did not play a 
political role (Lutterbeck, 34, 2013). The government has made an effort to separate the military 
from political issues by forbidding any political activity, and removing officers with political 
agendas. The military is the smallest in North Africa; in comparison to Libya, Tunisia has double 
the population of Libya but half the military size. The Tunisian army showed an openness to the 
pro-reform movements of 2010, and the General Rachid Ammar restricted his men from 
shooting at the protestors, as well as informed the police that he would retaliate if they began 
firing at the protestors (Lutterbeck, 34, 2013). The Tunisian army did not play a large role 
attacking the protestors or the regime during the revolution, however it did seem inclined to 
support the revolution. With regards to the role the Tunisian military played during the 
revolution, it was not a large force of conflict and predominately stayed out of the way during the 
uprisings.  
 The impact of a strong civil society on a less violent transition can be seen through the 
increased forms of communication and the low levels of conflict seen throughout the country. 
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Many of the unions, such as the UGTT, had such a large presence throughout the entire country 
that it was able to play the role of mediator across various cities and sectors of society. It played 
an important role in getting the revolution started, but an equally as important role in keeping 
Tunisia on the right track. The Quartet, which won the Nobel Peace Prize for its work, was a mix 
of civil society groups whose leaders became mediators throughout the revolution. Tunisia and 
Egypt were on similar paths of increasing conflict before the Quartet was formed in 2013. In 
reference to the Intensity of Internal Conflict table discussed earlier, Tunisia and Egypt were 
both at a level 3 intensity at 2012, and while Tunisia’s stayed constant in 2013, Egypt’s increased 
to a level 4. The ability of Tunisia’s strong civil society to communicate with large numbers of 
people across the country facilitated the dialogue between the protestors and the government.  
 
EGYPT  
 Soon after the uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt followed suit. On the 25th of January 2011, and 
the 18 days that followed, protests erupted involving tens of thousands of citizens. In an attempt 
to control the protests, the government shut off the country’s internet access. By the end of 
January the U.S. embassy began a voluntary evacuation as violence escalated. The President, 
Hosni Mubarak, appointed a Vice President for the first time in 30 years, and on February 10th, 
Mubarak handed off all power to the newly appointed Vice President. Protests continued, the 
military dissolved the Egyptian Parliament, and violent protests continued till the end of 2011. 
The first democratically elected President, Mohamed Morsi, and on the 22nd of November 2012 
new protests erupted. The military overthrew the government on the 3rd of July 2013. The 
military cracked down on the Muslim Brotherhood by jailing and killing many of the supporters, 
many activists from the protests have been sentenced to life. Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, previously 
head of the Egyptian Armed Forces was voted into the Presidential role on the 8th of June 2014. 
29 
 
Hosni Mubarak and his former interior minister were sentenced to life in prison for their failure 
to stop the killings during the first six days of the revolution.  
 Mass protests took place in Tahrir Square, resulting in 846 deaths and a forceful response 
from the riot police. Using tear gas in Tahrir square, the police forced the protests to reform at 
night. This action fueled the protestors, leading to the “Friday of Anger.” Egyptians who were 
claim that it was the turning point of the revolution (Brownlee, Masoud, Reynolds, 2015). With 
protests as large as they were, the police retreated and the army moved in. Mubarak installed a 
security cabinet of men to aid in the militaries management of the protests. Mubarak made a 
television announcement stating that he would not run for another term or pass on the 
presidential role to his son, but he did not step down. The following day, the “Battle of the 
Camel,” occurred, when men on horses and camels hired by two of Egypt’s Members of 
Parliament came in and attacked demonstrators (Fathi, 2012). Regime agents sniped at 
demonstrators from rooftops while protestors formed barricades and shields. The battle left over 
a thousand wounded and 11 dead. The following day, “Friday of Departure,” involved peaceful 
protests of over a hundred thousand people (Brownlee, Masoud, Reynolds, 2015).  
 As with most countries in the Arab world, freedom to organize in Egypt was restricted. 
NGOs in Egypt had to register and acquire a license through, which monitors their activities and 
budgets by the restrictive Law on Community Associations and Foundations – Law 84 of 2002 
(Beinin, 2014). The law prohibits political activity, extra approval was required to affiliate with a 
foreign organization. The Ministry had to approve transfer of funds from Egyptians abroad. The 
Ministry has been critiqued for rejecting licenses for overly vague reasons, a mark of excessive 
government discretion which is a primary barrier to Egypt being able to build a strong civil 
society. Islamist organizations, such as the Muslim Brotherhood which was established in 1928, 
30 
 
acts as a religious, social and political organization that has not faced many barriers. The Muslim 
Brotherhood has achieved a level of influence previously unimaginable, which shows the power 
of the freedom to organize and collaborate (Wickham, 2015). The Muslim Brotherhood launched 
a political party and won almost half of the seats in the 2011-2012 parliamentary elections, and 
their candidate Mohamed Morsi won the 2012 Presidential election. The role of free access to 
civil society is evident here – Morsi was not representative of the society’s demands. During his 
Presidency, he announced that being President was above the law and was not subject to judicial 
review. He also suddenly announced massive tax increases, as well as gas and water shortages. 
He was overthrown within a year by mass protests (Goldman, 2013). The success of a singular 
unrestricted organization emphasizes the power of freedom of association, and illustrates why 
free and equal access to civil society is necessary for the democratization process. In a closer 
look at Egypt’s NGO laws prior to the Arab Spring, many of which are still being applied such 
as the Constitution granting freedom to association. A minimum of 10 individuals is needed to 
register to be an association, in comparison to 2 in Tunisia. After all the paperwork had been 
submitted, the Ministry of Solidarity Articles had a deadline of 60 days to approve or reject the 
organization, and if the 60 days had passed with no decision then the organization would be 
automatically approved. However, there have been reports of the Ministry has often failed to 
meet the default regulation caused by the 60 days. Associations must submit a list of all the 
candidates running for their board of directors to the Ministry, after which the Ministry is then 
allowed the remove any of the candidates for not fulfilling the nomination requirements, even 
though no such requirements exist within the laws. Egyptian officials are also granted permission 
to intervene in the normal operations of NGO’s. NGO’s are required to send a list of meeting 
dates including meeting agendas, and The General Federation is allowed to send a representative 
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to that meeting and the following one. Minutes of the meeting are required to be sent back to the 
Ministry. In comparison to the previous case study on Tunisia, Egypt’s associations face many 
more obstacles in terms of registering an organization, and there is much more government 
observance once an association has started (The International Center for Not-for-Profit Law).  
Analyzing the second function of civil society, Egypt had weak collaboration amongst 
organizations due to two main reasons; 
1) A lack of organizations  
2) Conflict between existing organizations 
The lack of collaboration between organizations was due in large part to the lack of 
organizations themselves. This lack of diversity in Egypt’s civil society played into the country’s 
difficult and violent transition into a democracy. Egypt held a relatively weak civil society, 
mainly dominated by Islamic institutions which gave them leverage during the revolution and 
democratic elections. This contrasts with Tunisia’s relatively strong civil society, with a strong 
secular base of a variety of organizations. Secondly, organizations that did exist in Egypt 
experienced conflict with each other. Islamic NGO’s condemned civil society for being un-
Islamic, and women’s organizations and human rights groups have been attacked for their 
identification with these Western concepts (Rahman, 2002, 32). 
 Egypt’s civil society faced restrictions in terms of individual’s ability to join an 
organization, as well as difficulty communicating amongst organizations. These restrictions 
resulted in various forms of conflict, mainly between protestors resulting in 6,000 injuries, but 
also towards security forces such as the burning of police stations. There was violence between 
the supporters and proponents of Mubarak, as well as against journalists. These restrictions to 
form a collaborative civil society can be shown by how even the Egyptian military was split 
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during the revolution. The Egyptian military, in contrast to Tunisia’s, has been a powerful force 
in the Middle East. According to the Egyptian citizens, it is the most well respected institution in 
the country (Stier, 2011). The Egyptian military can be described by the term ‘praetorian state,’ 
coined by Amos Perlmutter, in which the military tends to intervene and has the potential to 
dominate the executive’ (Lutterbeck, 33, 2013). Mubarak formed an early relationship with the 
military by granting it access to land and business deals. The military has always been a key 
pillar within the Egyptian political system, and until the Arab Spring, Presidents of Egypt mainly 
came from the military. It also has had a foothold in the economic sector of Egypt in industries 
such as electronics, infrastructure, and consumer goods. The role of the military during the 
revolution was ambiguous, it supported the protestors while being on the side of the regime 
(Lutterbeck, 38, 2013). The military arbitrarily arrested and even tortured demonstrators, 
however it ultimately also forced Mubarak to step down. In comparison to Tunisia’s military, the 
Egyptian military partially resisted pro-reform movements; it was more bound to the regime 
however it did not directly oppose or support it during the revolution. Looking at how the 
Egyptian military stood on both sides of the revolution, it was a source of conflict.  
 Egypt’s fight for democracy continued until 2014 – three years after the first protests 
emerged. The protests erupted in waves, with two separate presidential elections. The country 
stood divided between groups from the Islamist, liberal, anti-capitalist, nationalist, and feminist 
perspectives. Unable to determine their goals and stand behind a specific presidential candidate 
early on, a military coup took place in order to take control. While a civil society of some form 
existed in Egypt, the barriers to entry created by The Ministry of Social Solidarity and Justice, 
and the lack of collaboration between organizations, resulted in an ineffective move towards 
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democracy. This lack of civil society resulted in a lack of collaboration and violent protests, 
which led to a more challenging revolution and transition to democracy. 
 
LIBYA 
            Libya provides a viewpoint from the opposite side of the spectrum of Tunisia. After the 
Arab Spring movements in Tunisia, Libya experienced a full-scale revolt which begun on the 
17th of February 2011. On the 20th of February, unrest had centered itself in Tripoli. Violence in 
the country continued to rise, as powers such as France, the UN Security Council, and the U.S. 
stepped in. On the 20th of October, Gadhafi was captured and killed in the city of Sirte. 
            Prior to 2011 in Libya, civil society was virtually non-existent under the rule of 
Muammar Gaddafi. Since civil society is such a vital part to a democracy, the level of civil 
society was so low that outsiders feared even with the fall of Gadhafi, that it would be extremely 
difficult to build a viable government. Freedom of the press, trade unions, and political 
opposition, were all banned under the law (Petré, 2014). The Libyan Constitution contains no 
guarantee of a right to association. Individuals were only allowed to join an institution run by the 
government, such as the National Trade Unions’ Federation, under Law 71 of 1972. Libya has 
been compared to Saudi Arabia, in the way that it had the most extreme and restrictive NGO 
laws in the Middle East. When other countries that participated in the Arab Spring began to 
revolt, Libya had catch up work to do in terms of understanding their collective interests and 
organizing around them. This need for civil society in Libya has been acknowledged, by Charles 
Dunne for example, the Director of Middle East and North Africa programs at Freedom House, 
when he stated that while the revolution has created a time of crisis in Libya, it has been a 
positive opportunity for the emergence of civil society (Petré, 2014). 
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 The ability of each citizen to join an organization of his or her choosing, without 
government intervention is part of the backbone of civil society. However, during Gadhafi’s time 
as president he outlawed political parties, nongovernmental organizations, and free media. It was 
only in the last decade of his rule that he allowed the emergence of government organized 
NGO’s and quasi free media all in the form of top-down reform agenda set up by his son, Seif 
Al-Islam. Libyans had no true experience with forming NGO’s or civil society (Dunne, 2011). 
Yet another obstacle they had to handle, is the lack of human development. Gadhafi imposed 
international isolation on the country, and failed to invest adequately in education, resulting in 
low levels of human development, an essential component to building a civil society. In terms of 
developing a civil society, government control and human development go hand in hand, and in 
this case where they were both restricted, Libya was left with low levels of civil society and an 
incapability of rebuilding a democratic government.   
 The second key aspect of civil society, collaboration, is virtually missing from Libya’s 
growing civil society. Organizations lacked the ability to communicate amongst themselves, and 
within government officials. In 2014, organizations relating to women’s rights, education, and 
good governance were being created, however even though they operated underground it was 
very dangerous, in particular for the women (Petré, 2014). Furthermore, there was a lack of 
collaboration within the government. The weak police and military forces face difficult 
controlling the militia groups fighting for power. At the same time, there are two governments 
also in search of more power.  The number of groups fighting for different goals and power 
magnifies the country’s inability to collaborate and discuss solutions for their new government. 
The violence Libya experienced was in large part due to the citizen’s lack of ability to 
collaborate.  
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 Libya experienced one of the highest levels of revolutionary violence through the Arab 
Spring, with the protests evolving into a civil war extremely quickly. Police stations were 
burned, military forces were deployed in force, and at least one helicopter sprayed fire onto 
peaceful protestors (Shadid, 2011). Violence was used by protestors and of the government. As 
shown in the internal conflict data discussed earlier, the level of violence in Libya rose 
dramatically in 2011. Large protests and violence existed in the beginning of both the Tunisian 
and Libyan uprisings, however when the two countries began to try and organize, Libya’s low 
level of civil society acted as its limiting factor. This high level of violence continued onto 2012, 
and the government has yet to reach a level of stability similar to Tunisia or Egypt. A large 
section of Libya’s violence stems from the fight for power by the Muslim Brotherhood, tribal 
loyalties, and militia groups, all of whom attempt to impose their power into the political scene 
(Mel, 2013). The government’s lack of security highlights their lack of control in their own 
country. In October 2013, the Libyan Prime Minister was kidnapped and held in the Ministry of 
the Interior by Libyan Revolutionaries, Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, Libyan Shield Brigades 
along with other militias (Mel, 2013). Similarly, residences of Libyan governments and other 
government officials had been kidnapped. Apart from the capitol, cities such as Misratah and 
Zintan experienced sustained fighting throughout 2011. 
Another source of conflict for Libya is the lack of strong military force. Unlike Tunisia and 
Egypt, the military is not an autonomous institution, instead it is part of the ruling regime. The 
military is very connected to the government through personal relations, such as Qaddafi’s sons 
heading important military units. In comparison to Tunisia, which has one of if not the most 
apolitical military in the Middle East, Libya is on the other end and has one of the most political 
militaries. The personal connection between Qaddafi and the military continues through the 
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security forces, many of which were built around the principles of Qaddafis Green Book, a book 
published in 1975 setting out the political philosophy of Qaddafi, and which was intended to be 
required reaching for all Libyans (Lutterbeck, 40, 2013). Qaddafi kept the military week, and the 
army was fragmented largely due to its large size and underdevelopment. This caused parts of 
the military during the revolution to break off and fight against the regime, while others stuck 
with the regime till the very end (Lutterbeck, 41, 2013). Furthermore, Qaddafi increased the 
violence in other forms. He was said to have bought foreign mercenaries from sub-saharan 
African countries, such as Mali, Niger, and Chad against the protestors. They were paid 500 
EUR per day and an additional 9,000 EUR for every Libyan killed (Lutterbeck, 41, 2013). This 
extreme fragmentation was another source of conflict during the revolution.  
In comparison with the other two case studies, Libya’s civil society faced more barriers 
to entry, and once organizations were formed they faced conflict amongst each other. Certain 
religious organizations were allowed more freedom, which as described above had its negative 
impacts when certain government officials were not representative of the general population. The 
increase of violence in this case study is evident, from the increase in deaths and the brutal 
tactics of a security force helicopter unleashing fire onto protestors. The inability to 
communicate and collaborate sent the state into conflict, and a prolonged violent revolution.  
 
CONCLUSION  
This paper analyzed the role civil society plays in being able to lessen the levels of 
revolutionary violence experienced during a revolution. The case studies of Tunisia, Egypt and 
Libya highlighted the importance of a strong civil society and its ability to mediate and work 
through conflict in order to aid in the progression of a country through a revolution.  
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A strong civil society can be analyzed by a citizen’s ability to join an organization, and the 
collaboration between multiple organizations. When these two functions are met a civil society 
in which citizens can collaborate and exercise the power of decisionmaking is formed. This 
paper also acknowledges that civil society in and of itself cannot move a country through a 
revolution, and that there are other factors like the institutions of a state, such as the NGO laws 
dictating the growth of the civil society, and the military dictating the actions of civil society 
during the revolution. It merely advocates that a strong civil society can aid in mediating 
discussion throughout a revolution, leading lower levels of revolutionary violence seen. The 
other factors involved in moving a country through a revolution can be analyzed in future 
research. That being said, a more in depth analysis could be conducted to decipher where a 
strong civil society could in fact stand up to strong military force. 
 This paper followed three in depth case studies of three major countries in the Arab 
Spring. The research began with Tunisia, the country that started the Arab Spring and was the 
only country to reach a democracy coupled with the least amount of violence. It then moved onto 
Egypt, which highlighted how a lack of communication and collaboration between organizations 
can lead to long periods of conflict. Lastly, the Libyan case study emphasized the power of 
outside forces such as a military on a transition, which sparks interest for future research. 
Additionally, the paper looked at the implications of the military, as well as the policies set in 
place to allow or prevent a civil society to form. The connection between the laws and the civil 
society that formed is one of the contributions to the research on civil society and the Arab 
Spring.  
While the impact of civil society has been studied in certain regions, there is room for further 
research of its global impact.  One of the largest limitations in analyzing civil society on a global 
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perspective is how the economic, historical, and cultural developments of each region impacts its 
definition of civil society. It is further defined by factors such as political oppression and 
education. Eastern Europe, Latin America, and Africa have had different versions of civil 
societies. With regards to Eastern Europe, as Dauderrstzdt and Gerrits argue, the strength of civil 
society played a large role in the successes or failures seen in Europe during its democratization. 
Central Europe and South Eastern Europe in particular faced multiple obstacles in their 
democratization which has been attributed to an underdevelopment of their civil society 
(Dauderrstzdt and Gerrits, 2000, 361). Birle identified multiple types of civil society in Latin 
America, and note that while it was limited under a military dictatorship, it still held a presence 
(Birle, 2000, 232-234). The functions and limitations of civil society depend on the region, 
which is clearly evident when looking at the case of Africa. In the post-colonial phase, there was 
no room for civil society. Colonization left behind oppressive strategies that continue till this 
day. While this is a force present in the Middle East, Africa has also suffered from a long history 
of economic difficulty, which limits society’s freedom to form a civil society (Paffenholz, 2010, 
11). The idea of civil society is dependent on the society itself, however there is still much to be 
learnt about the coordination and collaboration between organizations from a global perspective. 
Additionally, a quantitative measurement of civil society would facilitate in the global analysis 
of civil society.  
 A byproduct of a strong civil society and its mediating abilities, and this in itself is not 
enough to topple a regime. There are other factors that contributed to the start of the Arab 
Spring; however, while this papemr does not argue that civil society sparked the Arab Spring, it 
does argue that the varying levels of civil society were related to the levels of conflict 
experienced. This strength of civil society stems from organic organization of citizens, and not 
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forced organizations that the government sets in place. It is by definition, a public space where 
citizens can come together. Humans are naturally inclined to fight for their needs and wants, and 
conflict results when those are not being met. Civil society was a peaceful force during the 
revolutions to gather people’s opinions and guide them into striving towards common goals. In 
countries where no civil society existed before the revolution, such as Libya, those goals were 
lost in the crowd of protestors, and no effective change was made. This aspect of reduced 
revolutionary violence can be used as a signal to other countries of the importance of civil 
society. 
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